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Abstract
The problem of market clearing is to set a price for an item such that
quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. In this work, we cast the
problem of predicting clearing prices into a learning framework and use the
resulting models to perform revenue optimization in auctions and markets
with contextual information. The economic intuition behind market clear-
ing allows us to obtain fine-grained control over the aggressiveness of the
resulting pricing policy, grounded in theory. To evaluate our approach, we
fit a model of clearing prices over a massive dataset of bids in display ad
auctions from a major ad exchange. The learned prices outperform other
modeling techniques in the literature in terms of revenue and efficiency
trade-offs. Because of the convex nature of the clearing loss function, the
convergence rate of our method is as fast as linear regression.
1 Introduction
A key difficulty in designing machine learning systems for revenue optimization
in auctions and markets is the discontinuous nature of the problem. Consider
the basic problem of setting a reserve price in a single-item auction (e.g., for
online advertising): revenue steadily increases with price up to the point where
all buyers drop out, at which point it suddenly drops to zero. The discontinuity
may average away over a large market, but one is typically left with a highly
non-convex objective.
We are interested in obtaining pricing policies for revenue optimization in a
data-rich (i.e., contextual) environment, where each product is associated with a
set of features. For example, in online display advertising, a product is an ad
impression (an ad placement viewed by the user) which is annotated with features
like geo-information, device type, cookies, etc. There are two main approaches
to reserve pricing in this domain: one is to divide the feature space into well
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defined clusters and apply a traditional (non-contextual) revenue optimization
algorithm in each cluster [18, 9, 20, 19]. This is effectively a semi-parametric
approach with the drawback that an overly fine clustering leads to data sparsity
and inability to learn across clusters. An overly coarse clustering, on the other
hand, does not fully take advantage of the rich features available.
To overcome these difficulties, a natural alternative is to fit a parametric
pricing policy by optimizing a loss function. The first instinct is to use revenue
itself as a loss function, but this loss is notoriously difficult to optimize because it
is discontinuous, non-convex, and has zero gradient over much of its domain—so
one must look to surrogates. Medina and Mohri [14] propose a continuous
surrogate loss for revenue whose gradient information is rich enough to optimize
for prices. The loss is nevertheless non-convex so optimizing it relies on techniques
from constrained DC-programming, which have provable convergence but limited
scalability in high-dimensional contexts.
Main contribution. The main innovation in this paper is to address the
revenue optimization problem by instead looking to the closely related problem
of market clearing: how to set prices so that demand equals supply. The loss
function for market clearing exhibits several nice properties from a learning
perspective, notably convexity. The market clearing objective dates back to
the economic theory of market equilibrium [2], and more recently arises in the
literature on iterative auctions [4, 11, 3]. To our knowledge, our work is the first
to use it as a loss function in a machine learning context.
The economic insight behind the market-clearing loss function allows us to
adapt its shape to control how conservative or aggressive the resulting prices
are in extracting revenue. To increase price levels, we can artificially increase
demand or limit supply, which connects revenue optimization theorems from
computational economics [5, 21] to regularization techniques under our loss
function.
We begin by casting the problem of market clearing as a learning problem.
Given a dataset where each record corresponds to an item characterized by a
feature vector, together with buyer bids and seller asks for the item, the goal of
the pricing policy is to quote a price that balances supply and demand; with a
single seller, this simply means predicting a price in between the highest- and
second-highest bids, which intuitively improves over the baseline of no reserve
pricing.
This offers us a general framework for price optimization in contextual
settings, but the objective function of market clearing is still disconnected from
revenue optimization. Revenue is the aggregate price paid by buyers, while
market clearing is linked to the problem of optimizing efficiency (realized value).
Efficiency can be measured as social welfare (the total value of the allocated
items), or more coarsely via the match rate (the number of cleared transactions).
The platform faces a tension between trying to extract as much revenue as
possible from buyers, while also leaving them enough surplus to discourage a
move to competing platforms.
To better understand the trade-off between revenue and efficiency, we consider
the linear programming duality between allocation and pricing and observe
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that a natural parameter that trades-off revenue for efficiency is the available
supply. Artificially limiting supply (or increasing demand) allows one to control
the aggressiveness of the resulting clearing prices output by the model. This
fundamental idea has been used multiple times more recently in algorithmic
game theory to design approximately revenue-optimal auctions [12, 9, 21, 10].
Translating this intuition to our setting, a simple modification of the primal
(allocation) linear program has the effect of restricting the supply. In the dual
(pricing) linear program, this is equivalent to adding a regularization to the
market-clearing objective function.
The focus of this paper is empirical. As our main application, we use
this methodology to optimize reserve prices in display advertising auctions.
We demonstrate the efficacy of the market clearing loss for reserve pricing
by experimentally comparing it with other strategies on a real-world data
set. Coupled with the experimental evaluation, we establish some theoretical
guarantees on match rate and efficiency for the optimal pricing policy under
clearing loss. The theory provides guidance on how to set the regularization
parameters and we investigate how this translates to the desired trade-offs
experimentally.
Experimental results. We evaluate our method against a linear-regression
based approach on a dataset consisting of over 200M auction records from a major
display advertising exchange. The features are represented as 84K-dimensional
sparse vectors and contain information such as the website on which the ad will
be displayed, device and browser type, and country of origin. As benchmarks we
consider standard linear regression on either the highest or second-highest bid,
and models fit using the surrogate revenue loss proposed by Medina and Mohri
[14]. We find that our method Pareto-dominates the benchmarks in terms of
the trade-off between revenue and match rate or social welfare. For example,
for the best revenue obtained from regression approach, we can obtain a pricing
function with at least the same revenue but 5% higher social welfare and 10%
higher match rate. We also find that the convergence rate of fitting models under
our loss function is as fast as a standard linear regression. In comparison, the
surrogate loss of Medina and Mohri [14] has much slower convergence due to its
non-convexity.
Related work. There is a large body of literature on learning algorithms
for optimizing revenue, however, most of the literature deals with the non-
contextual setting. Cole and Roughgarden [8], Morgenstern and Roughgarden
[17, 16], Paes Leme et al. [19] study the batch-learning non-contextual problem.
Roughgarden and Wang [20] study the non-contextual problem both in the online
and batch learning settings. Cesa-Bianchi et al. [6] study it as a non-contextual
online learning problem. Finally, there has been a lot of recent interest in the
contextual online learning version [1, 7, 13], but those ideas are not applicable
to the batch-learning setting.
Closest to our work are Medina and Mohri [14] and Medina and Vassilvitskii
[15], who also study contextual reserve price optimization in a batch-learning
setting. Medina and Mohri [14] proves generalization bounds, defines a surrogate
loss as a continuous approximation to the revenue loss, and proposes an algorithm
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with provable convergence based on DC programming. The algorithm, however,
requires solving a convex program in each iteration. Medina and Vassilvitskii
[15] propose a clustering based approach, which involves the following steps:
learning a least-square predictor of the bid, clustering the feature space based on
the linear predictor, and optimizing the reserve using a non-contextual method
in each cluster.
2 Market Clearing Loss
This section introduces our model, proceeding from the general to the specific.
We first explain the duality between allocation and pricing, which motivates
the form of the loss function to fit clearing prices, and provides useful economic
insights into how the input data defines its shape. We next define the formal
problem of learning a clearing price function in an environment with several
buyers and sellers. We then specialize to a single-item, second-price auction
(multiple buyers, single seller).
Allocation and Pricing
We consider a market with n buyers and m sellers who aim to trade quantities of
an item (e.g., a stock or commodity) among themselves. Each buyer i is defined
by a pair (bi, µi) where bi ∈ R+ is a bid price and µi ∈ R+ is a quantity. The
interpretation is that the buyer is willing to buy up to µi units of the item at a
price of at most bi per unit. Similarly, each seller j is defined by a pair (cj , λj)
where cj ∈ R+ is an ask price and λj ∈ R+ is the quantity of item the seller can
supply. The ask price can be viewed as a cost of production, or as an outside
offer available to the seller, so that the seller will decline to sell item units for
any price less than its ask.
The allocation problem associated with the market is to determine quantities
of the item supplied by the sellers, and consumed by the buyers, so as to maximize
the gains from trade—value consumed minus cost of production. Formally, let
xi be the quantity bought by buyer i and yj the quantity sold by seller j. The
optimal gains from trade are captured by the (linear) optimization problem:
max
0≤xi≤µi,0≤yj≤λj
n∑
i=1
bixi −
m∑
j=1
cjyj
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi =
m∑
j=1
yj (1)
The optimization is straightforward to solve: the highest bid is matched with
the lowest ask, and the two agents trade as much as possible between each other.
The process repeats until the highest bid falls below the lowest ask. The purpose
of the linear programming formulation is to consider its dual, which corresponds
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to a pricing problem:
min
p
n∑
i=1
µi(bi − p)+ +
m∑
j=1
λj(p− cj)+ (2)
where (·)+ denotes max{·, 0}. The optimal dual solution corresponds to a price
that balances demand and supply, which is the central concept in this paper.
Definition 1. A price p∗ is a clearing price if, for any optimal solution (x∗,y∗)
to the allocation problem, we have
x∗i ∈ arg max
xi∈[0,µi]
xi(bi − p)
y∗j ∈ arg max
yj∈[0,λj ]
yj(p− cj)
for each buyer i and seller j,
In words, a clearing price balances supply and demand by ensuring that, at
an optimal allocation, each buyer buys a quantity that maximizes its utility
(value minus price), and similarly each seller sells a quantity that maximizes
its profit (price minus cost). In the current simple setup with a single item,
buyer i will buy µi units if bi > p, zero units if bi < p, and is indifferent to
the number of units bought at p = bi; similarly for each seller j. However, the
concept of clearing prices—where each agent maximizes its utility at the optimal
allocation—generalizes to much more complex allocation problems with multiple
differentiated items and nonlinear valuations over bundles of items [4].
The fact that a clearing price exists, and can be obtained by solving (2),
follows from standard LP duality. The complementary slackness conditions
relating optimal primal solution (x∗,y∗) to optimal dual solution p∗ amount to
the conditions of Definition 1. The optimal solution p∗ to the dual corresponds
to a Lagrange multiplier for constraint (1) which equates demand and supply.
Learning Formulation
To cast market clearing in a learning context, we consider a generic feature space
Z with the label space T = Rn+ × Rm+ consisting of bid and ask vectors (b, c).
For the sake of simplicity, we develop our framework assuming that the number
of buyers and sellers remains fixed (at n and m), and that the item quantity
that each agent demands or supplies (µi or λj) is also fixed. This information
is straightforward to incorporate into the label space if needed, and our results
can be adapted accordingly. The objective is to fit a price predictor (also called
a pricing policy) p : Z → R to a training set of data {(zk,bk, ck)} drawn from
Z×T , to achieve good prediction performance on separate test data drawn from
the same distribution as the training data.
As a concrete example, the training data could consist of bids and asks for a
stock on a financial exchange throughout time, and the features might be recent
5
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Figure 1: Effect on the shape of the clearing loss when adding a buyer or a seller.
economic data on the company, time of day or week, etc. The clearing problem
here is equivalent to predicting a price within each datapoint’s bid-ask spread
given the features. As another example, the data could consist of bids for ad
impressions on a display ad exchange, and the features might be contextual
information about the website (e.g., topic) and user (e.g., whether she is on
mobile or desktop). The clearing problem there reduces to predicting a price
between the highest and second-highest bids.
Based on our developments so far, the correct loss function to fit clearing
prices is given by (2), which we call the clearing loss:
`c(p, z,b, c) =
n∑
i=1
µi(bi − p(z))+ +
m∑
j=1
λj(p(z)− cj)+
Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the clearing loss (in green) under an instance
with buyers ($1, 1), ($4, 1), ($5, 2) and sellers ($2, 1), ($3, 1). Note that although
the first buyer’s bid of $1 lies below any of the sellers’ costs, it still contributes
to the shape of the loss. Here any price between $4 and $5 is a clearing price.
If we add an extra buyer ($6, 1), the loss curve tilts to the right (in blue) and
the unique clearing price becomes $5; since there is more demand, the clearing
price increases. If we instead add an extra seller ($2, 2), the curve tilts to the
left (in pink) and the clearing price decreases; now any price between $3 and $4
is a clearing price. This example hints at a way to control the aggressiveness of
the price function p fit to the data, by artificially adjusting demand or supply.
Over a training set of data {(zk,bk, ck)}, model fitting consists of computing
a pricing policy p that minimizes the overall loss
∑
k `
c(p, zk,bk, ck). Under a
limited number of contexts zk, it may be possible to directly compute optimal
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clearing prices, or even revenue-maximizing reserve prices, based on the bid
distributions in each context [8, 18]. But this kind of nonparametric approach
quickly runs into difficulties when there is a large number of contexts or even
continuous features, where issues of data sparsity and discretization arise. Our
formulation allows one to impose some structure on the pricing policy (e.g., a
linear model or neural net) whenever this aids with generalization.
From a learning perspective, clearing loss has several attractive properties.
It is a piece-wise linear convex function of the price, where the kink locations
are determined by the bids and asks. The magnitude of its derivatives depends
only on the buyer and seller quantities, which makes it robust to any outliers
in the bids or asks. By its derivation via LP duality, its optimal value equals
the optimal gains from trade, which are easy to compute. This gives a reference
point to quantify how well a price function fits any given dataset.
Reserve Pricing
As a practical application of the clearing loss, we consider the problem of reserve
pricing in a single-item, second-price auction. In this setting every buyer demands
a single unit (µi = 1), and there is a single seller (m = 1) with cost c. The seller
also has unit supply, but we still parametrize its quantity by λ to allow some
control on the shape of the loss.
We write b(1) and b(2) to denote the highest and second-highest bids, respec-
tively. In a single-item second-price auction, the item is allocated to the highest
bidder as long as b(1) ≥ c, and is charged c¯ ≡ max{b(2), c}. Second-price auctions
are extremely common and until now have been the dominant format for selling
display ads online through ad exchanges, among countless other applications.
It is common in second-price auctions for the seller to set a reserve price, a
minimum price that the winning bidder is charged. The cost c is itself a reserve
price, but the seller may choose to increase this to some price p in an attempt
to extract more revenue, at the risk of leaving the item unsold if it turns out
that b(1) < p. Revenue as a function of p can be negated to define a loss, which
we denote `r:
−`r(p, z,b, c) =
{
max{p(z), c¯} if max{p(z), c} ≤ b(1)
c otherwise
However, this loss is notoriously difficult to optimize directly, because it is non-
convex and even discontinuous, and its gradient is 0 except over a possibly narrow
range between the highest and second-highest bids. Clearing loss represents a
promising alternative for reserve pricing because any price between c¯ and b(1) is
a clearing price, so a correct clearing price prediction should intuitively improve
over the baseline of c. The clearing loss in the auction setting takes the form:
`c(p, z,b, c) =
n∑
i=1
(bi − p(z))+ + λ(p(z)− c)+ (3)
In practical applications of reserve pricing it is often desirable to achieve some
degree of control over the match rate—the fraction of auctions where the item is
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sold—and the closely related metric of social welfare—the aggregate value of
the items sold, where value is captured by the winning bid b(1). Formally, these
concepts are defined as follows, where the notation J·K is 1 if its predicate is true
and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2. On a single data point, the match rate at price p is MR(p) =Jb(1) ≥ max{p, c}K and the social welfare is SW(p) = b(1)Jb(1) ≥ max{p, c}K.
As with the revenue objective, match rate and social welfare are discontinuous
and their gradients are almost everywhere 0, so they are not directly suitable for
model fitting via convex optimization (i.e., one has to look to surrogates).
Note that the clearing loss (3) effectively contains a term that approximately
regularizes according to match rate. The seller’s term (p−c)+ can be viewed as a
hinge-type surrogate for match rate, since any setting of p above c risks impacting
match rate. Increasing λ improves match rate, in line with the earlier economic
intuition that increasing seller supply λ shifts the clearing price downwards.
Symmetrically, λ can be decreased within the range [0, 1] (the loss remains
convex in this range), which is equivalent to increasing each buyer’s demand
to µ = 1/λ. According to the economic intuition, this shifts the clearing price
upwards at the expense of match rate. The fact that the relevant range and
units of the regularization weight λ are understood is very convenient in practice.
In the next section, we derive a quantitative link between λ and match rate.
3 Theoretical Guarantees
In this section we prove approximation guarantees on the match rate and efficiency
performance of models fit using the clearing loss. The results of this analysis
will provide guidelines for setting the regularization parameters for fine-grained
control of the match rate.
We begin by characterizing the optimal pricing policy under clearing loss
when there is no restriction on the policy structure, assuming that bids and costs
are drawn independently (but not necessarily identically).
Proposition 3. If conditioned on each feature vector z the bid and cost distri-
butions are given by bi ∼ F zi and cj ∼ Gzj , then the pricing policy that optimizes
clearing loss is the solution to∑
i
µi(1− F zi (p(z))) =
∑
j
λjG
z
j (p(z)),
which is the policy that balances expected supply and demand.
Proof. We can write the expectation of the market clearing loss function as
follows:
E[`c(p)] =
n∑
i=1
µi
∫ ∞
p
(bi − p) dF zi (bi)
+
m∑
j=1
λj
∫ p
0
(p− cj) dGzj (cj).
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Taking the derivative with respect to p and setting it to zero leads to the result
in the statement:
0 =
d
dp
E[`c(p)] = −
n∑
i=1
µi(1− F zi (p)) +
m∑
j=1
λjG
z
j (p).
We now consider the single-item auction setting where m = 1 and µi = 1 for
all buyers. For simplicity, also assume that c = 0, which implies Gj(p) = 1 for
all p. In that case we can bound the match rate by a simple formula.
Proposition 4. In the setup with a single seller with λ supply and cost c = 0,
and independent buyer distributions, the expected match rate under the optimal
clearing price policy is at least 1− e−λ.
Proof. A transaction clears if there is at least one buyer with valuation above
the price p which happens with probability 1−∏ni=1 F zi (p). Since the optimal
policy p is the solution of
∑n
i=1(1− F zi (p)) = λ by the previous proposition, we
can bound the match rate as follows:
E[MR] = 1−
n∏
i=1
F zi (p) ≥ 1−
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
F zi (p)
]n
= 1−
[
1− λ
n
]n
≥ 1− e−λ
where the first inequality follows from the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality.
The preceding proposition provides a useful guideline on how to set the
regularization parameter λ to achieve a certain target match rate. We can also
obtain a similar bound for social welfare:
Corollary 5. In the setting of the previous proposition, the social welfare
E[SW] = E[b(1) · Jb(1) ≥ pK] obtained by the optimal clearing price policy is at
least 1− e−λ of the optimal social welfare, obtained by setting no reserves.
Proof. This follows from the fact that E[b(1) · Jb(1) ≥ pK] ≥ E[b(1)] · P[b(1) ≥ p] ≥
(1− e−λ) · E[b(1)].
Another interesting corollary is that when buyers are i.i.d., fitting a clearing
price is equivalent to fitting a certain quantile of the common bid distribution.
Corollary 6. In the setup of the previous proposition with i.i.d. buyers, the
optimal clearing price policy is to set the price at p(z) = F−1(1 − λ/n) where
F = F zi .
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This result makes explicit how varying λ in the clearing loss tunes the
aggressiveness of the resulting price function, by moving up or down the quantiles
of the bid distribution. In particular, it’s possible to span all quantiles using λ ∈
[0,+∞]. Fitting clearing prices is not exactly equivalent to quantile regression,
since the relevant quantile depends on the number of buyers, which is a property
of the data and not fixed in advance.
4 Empirical Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our approach of using predicted clearing prices as
a reserve pricing policy in second-price auctions. We collected a dataset of
auction records by sampling a fraction of the logs from Google’s Ad Exchange
over two consecutive days in January 2019. Our sample contains over 100M
records for each day. In display advertising, online publishers (e.g., websites like
nytimes.com) can choose to request an ad from an exchange when a user visits a
page on their site. The exchange runs a second-price auction (the most common
auction format) among eligible advertisers, possibly with a reserve price.
We clip bid vectors to the 5 highest bids. As the publisher cost c, we use a
reserve price available in the data which is meant to capture the opportunity
cost1 of not showing ads from other sources besides the exchange, in line with
our model.2 Reserve prices are only relevant conditional on the top bid exceeding
the publisher cost, so the auction records were filtered to satisfy this condition.
When reporting our results this means that the baseline match rate without any
reserve pricing is 100%, so we will refer to it as relative match rate in our plots
to emphasize this fact.
All the models we evaluate3 are linear models of the price p as a function
of features z of the auction records. The only difference between the models is
the loss function used to fit each one, to focus on the impact of the choice of
loss function. The features we used included: publisher id, device type (mobile,
desktop, tablet), OS type (e.g., Android or iOS), country, and format (video or
display). For sparse features like publisher id we used a one-hot encoding for the
most common ids and an ‘other’ bucket for ids in the tail. The models were all
fit using TensorFlow with the default Adam optimizer and minibatches of size
512 distributed over 20 machines. An iteration corresponds to one minibatch
update in each machine, therefore 20 × 512 data points. The models were all
1A common alternative source of display ads besides exchanges are reservation contracts,
which are advertiser-publisher agreements to show a fixed volume of ads for a time period. If
the contract is not fulfilled, this comes at a penalty to the publisher.
2We also excluded additional sources of reserve prices from the dataset: (a) reserve prices
configured by publishers reflecting business objectives like avoiding channel conflict (i.e.,
protecting the value of inventory sold through other means) and (b) automated reserve prices
set by the exchange.
3We evaluate the models by simulating the effect of the new reserves on a test dataset.
The simulation does not take into account possible strategic responses on the part of buyers.
However, since the auction format is a second price auction, it is a dominant strategy for the
buyers to bid truthfully.
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trained over at least 400K iterations, although for some models convergence
occurred much earlier.
Besides the clearing loss used to fit our model, we considered several other
losses as benchmarks:
• Least-squares regression on the highest bid b(1).
• Least-squares regression on the 2nd-highest bid b(2).
• A revenue surrogate loss function proposed by Medina and Mohri [14] as a
continuous alternative to the pure revenue loss `r mentioned previously:
−`γ(p, z,b, c) =
 max{p(z), c¯} if p(x) ≤ b1c if p(x) > (1 + γ)b1
((1 + γ)b1 − p(x))/γ otherwise
The loss has a free parameter γ > 0 which can be tuned to control the
approximation to `r. Although this loss is continuous, it is still non-convex.
In our experiments we tried a range of γ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. Below we
report on the setting γ = 0.75 which gave the best revenue performance.
For each loss function we added the match-rate regularization λ(p− c)+, and
we varied λ to span a range of realized match rates. Recall that this regularization
is already implicit in the clearing loss, where λ can be construed as the item
quantity supplied by the seller. We used non-negative λ to ensure that convexity
is preserved if the original loss is itself convex.
We used the first day of data as the training set and the second day as the
test set. The performance was very similar on both for all fitted models, which
is expected due to the volume of data and the generalization properties of this
learning problem [17]. We report results over the test set below.
Revenue Performance
We first consider the revenue performance of the different losses as it trades
off against match rate and buyer welfare. Figure 2 plots the ratio of realized
revenue with learned reserves against the realized match rate (top). Both axes
are normalized by the revenue and match rate of the second price auction using
only the seller’s cost as reserves. Each point represents a pair of revenue and
match rate or welfare achieved at a certain setting λ. The most immediate
observation is that the curve traced out by the clearing loss Pareto dominates
the performance of the benchmark loss functions, in the sense that for any fixed
match rate, the clearing loss’ revenue performance lies higher than the others.
The best revenue performance is a 20% improvement achieved by the clearing
loss at λ = 0.25 with a match rate of 30%.
We also plot in the figure the revenue against welfare (bottom). We again
normalize each axis by the revenue and welfare of the auction that uses only
seller’s costs (which achieves the optimal social welfare). For the sake of clarity
the range of the x-axis has been clipped. The Pareto dominance here is even
11
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Figure 2: Trade-off between revenue improvement and decrease in match rate
(top) or buyer welfare (bottom). Each point represents the performance of the
fitted model under a loss function for a fixed regularization level.
more pronounced, and it’s also striking to note that clearing loss can achieve
revenue improvements of over 10% with less than 2% impact on buyer welfare.
Another interesting aspect of Figure 2 is the range of match rates spanned
by the different losses. Recall that, under the assumptions and results of
Proposition 4, varying λ from 0 to large values should allow the clearing loss
to span the full range of match rates in (0, 1), and this is borne out by the
plot. For the regressions on b(1) and b(2), there is a hard floor on the match rate
that they can achieve with λ = 0, respectively at 0.38 and 0.67. Another kind
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of regularization term would be needed to push these further downward and
reach more aggressive prices. Match rate for the surrogate loss was particularly
sensitive to regularization. Over a range of λ spanning from 0 to 1, only λ = 0
and λ = 0.1 yielded match rates below 1, at 0.47 and 0.92 respectively.
Controlling Match Rate
In practice setting the right regularization weight λ to achieve a target match
rate is usually process of trial and error, even to determine the relevant range to
inspect, and this was the case for all the benchmark losses. For the clearing loss,
however, Proposition 4 gives a link between match rate and λ which can serve
as a guide. Specifically, the result prescribes λ = log( 11−MR ) to achieve a match
rate of MR.
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Figure 3: Realized match rate against target match rate under the model fit
with the clearing loss, broken down by device type. The vertical line denotes the
parameter setting λ = 1 with a target match rate of 1− 1/e ≈ 0.63.
Figure 3 plots the target match rate implied by the settings of λ that we
used, according to this formula, against realized match rates. The vertical line
shows the reference point of λ = 1, which is the “default” form of the clearing
loss without artificially increasing or limiting supply, with an associated match
rate 1 − 1/e ≈ 0.63. The realized match rate tracks the target fairly well but
not perfectly. A possible reason for the discrepancy is that the assumption
of i.i.d. bidders that the formula relies on may not hold in practice. Another
possible reason is that the linear model may not be expressive enough to fit
the optimal price level within each feature context z. Interestingly, the target
match rate from Proposition 4 tracks not only the overall match-rate but also
segment-specific match rate. In Figure 3, we break down the match rates by
device type and find that they are very consistent across devices.
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Figure 4: Convergence rate of the model under different loss function, in mini-
batch iterations. We plot the value of each loss across iterations normalized by
its value upon convergence.
Convergence Rate
We next consider the convergence rates of model-fitting under the various loss
functions, plotted in Figure 4. Convergence rates for the clearing loss and the
regression losses are very comparable. The main difference between the curves
has to do with initialization. Initial prices tended to be high under our random
initialization scheme, which is more favorable to regression on the highest bid.
All models have converged by 100K iterations. Since square loss is ideal from an
optimization perspective, these results imply that models with clearing loss can
be fit very quickly and conveniently in practice, in a matter of hours over large
display ad datasets.
In Figure 5 we compare the convergence of the clearing loss with the surrogate
loss. Convergence is much slower under surrogate loss. This was expected, as the
loss is nonconvex and it has ranges with 0 gradient where the Adam optimizer
(or any of the other standard TensorFlow optimizers) cannot make progress; it
was nonetheless an important benchmark to evaluate since it closely mimics
the true revenue objective. Medina and Mohri [14] discuss alternatives for
optimizing the surrogate loss, and propose a special purpose algorithm based on
DC-programming (difference of convex functions programming), but they only
scale it to thousands of training instances. The fact that the surrogate loss has
not quite converged after 400K iterations is a contributing factor to its revenue
performance in Figure 2.
Effectiveness of Linear Regression
While the key take-away of our empirical evaluation is the fact that the clearing
loss dominates other methods in terms of revenue vs. match rate trade-offs,
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Figure 5: Convergence rate of the model under clearing and surrogate function,
in minibatch iterations. Both loss functions are smoothed using a 0.9 moving
average.
another surprising consequence of this study is the effectiveness of using a simple
regression on the top bid. The natural intuition would be that any least-squares
regression should perform poorly since it has the same penalty for underpricing
(which is a small loss in revenue) and overpricing (which can cause the transaction
to fail to clear and hence incur in a large revenue loss). Indeed it is the case that
an unregularized regression (the leftmost green point on Figure 2) incurs a large
match rate loss, but it also achieves significant revenue improvement (albeit with
an almost 5% loss in social welfare compared to the clearing loss).
Looking into the data, we found that an explanation for this fact is that
bid distributions tend to be highly skewed which causes standard regression
to underpredict for high bids and overpredict for low bids. In fact, under
zero regularization the linear regression on the top bid underpredicts 17.7%
of instances for bids below the median and 99.1% for bids above the median.
This type of behavior explains why standard regression can be effective in
practice despite the fact that square loss does not encode any difference between
underpredicting and overpredicting.
5 Conclusions
This paper introduced the notion of a predictive model for clearing prices in a
market with bids and asks for units of an item. The loss function is obtained
via the linear programming dual of the associated allocation problem. When
applied to the problem of revenue optimization via reserve prices in second-price
auctions, regularizing the loss has an intuitive interpretation as expanding or
limiting supply, which can be formally linked to the expected match rate. Our
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empirical evaluation over a dataset of bids from Google’s Ad Exchange confirmed
that a model of clearing prices outperforms standard regressions on bids, as well
as a surrogate loss for the direct revenue objective, in terms of the trade-off
between revenue and match rate (or social welfare). In future work, we plan to
develop models of clearing prices for more complex allocation problems such as
search advertising, where the clearing loss can be generalized (using the same
duality ideas presented in this paper) to handle a vector of position prices.
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